



Bosnia and Herzegovina Analytical Report

October 2021

Table of contents

1.0 Executive Summary	3
2.0 Key Political Developments	4
2.1 Bosnia’s Galloping Political Crisis	4
2.2 What does Dodik really want?	8
2.3 What does HDZ BiH really want?.....	9
2.4 What do the Russians really want?	10
2.5 What will the West do?.....	11
3.0 Economic and Social Developments	12
3.1 Economic Recovery Continues	12
Statistical data	15
Foreign trade	15
January – August 2021.....	15
Foreign Exchange Reserves.....	16
Banking sector	16
Inflation (CPI).....	16
Industrial production.....	17
Employment and Unemployment.....	17
Wages.....	18
Pensions.....	19

1.0 Executive Summary

For years, many local and international observers considered BiH's never-ending political crisis to be merely a status quo that could last forever, mostly ignored by citizens and the international community alike. Nevertheless, this crisis has started escalating rapidly ever since political parties from Bosnia's Republika Srpska entity pulled out of state institutions in July. Since then, the country witnessed renewed separatist threats, mounting nationalist rhetoric and other developments that are shaking the very foundations of the country and causing fears of possible new ethnic conflict. This situation took a new turn for the worse after Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik declared his plan to initiate the annulment of all past decisions transferring competencies from the entity to the state level and taking Bosnia back to the "original Dayton." If carried out, this initiative would create political, legal and administrative chaos and set the stage for the possible breakup of the country, which would be unlikely to pass without new conflict. With such a perspective, BiH is becoming more and more of a liability and a security threat for the US and EU, but neither Washington nor EU capitals are showing much willingness, readiness and/or capacity to respond to this crisis in any concrete way. A clearer picture of the seriousness of the situation may become apparent by the beginning of November, when the UN Security Council (UNSC) will be voting on the regular annual extension of the mandate of the EU peacekeeping force (EUFOR). This event will reveal Russia's stance on BiH and the rest of the Balkans. Meanwhile, despite deepening crisis, the Bosnian economy in this period continued its recovery thanks to the still growing exports to EU markets.

2.0 Key Political Developments

2.1 Bosnia's Galloping Political Crisis

Following the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb officials from the state institutions in July, the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued throughout August and then escalated rapidly as of the beginning of September, with a number of developments, hardening positions and radical rhetoric by almost all key local political actors.

BiH state institutions remain blocked due to the boycott of political representatives from Republika Srpska. In August the ruling Bosnian Croat party, the HDZ, indicated it was supporting RS officials in their boycott. HDZ officials proposed suspension of the work of several parliament committees because of the absence of RS representatives. When Bosniak representatives refused those proposals, HDZ representatives left the sessions, blocking the work of the committees on the grounds that there was insufficient quorum for them to continue working. These signals support reports from Bosnian Croat sources suggesting that the HDZ is also preparing to leave state institutions by this December, unless appropriate electoral reforms are adopted by then, which now seems almost impossible given the blockade of the state parliament.

The blockade of the State Presidency and State Parliament blocked the appointment of the new deputy governor and managing board of the Central Bank of BiH (CBBiH), whose mandates ended on August 10th, which has created problems that could risk BiH's fiscal and monetary stability. The confusion and controversy started on August 10th, when the CBBiH announced that the Bosnian Presidency has approved Central Bank Governor Senad Softic's proposal to appoint Zeljko Maric to the vacated position of the deputy governor of the Bank (after the mandate of the previous (Serb) deputy governor, Milica Lakic has expired on August 10th). On the same day, the office of the Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency and the leader of the ruling RS party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, Milorad Dodik, issued a statement denying that Dodik had participated in the Presidency telephone session. Therefore, Dodik's office claimed that the Presidency was in no position to approve this appointment. After consultations with international officials, the Central Bank announced that it will continue operating with the outgoing executive board and newly appointed deputy governor until state institutions appoint new management. This situation represents a potentially

serious threat to the stability of the monetary and fiscal system of BiH, since such destabilization of a key monetary institution could cause panic among citizens as well as foreign banks, which control the majority of the banking sector in Bosnia. So far, however, the commercial banking sector has simply ignored this political drama regarding the CBBH. Foreign exchange reserves in August had grown by 6.2% compared with the previous month and increased by 6.3% compared with August of the previous year, while the amount of reserves reached a record €7.9 billion.¹ Total assets of the Bosnian commercial banks also continue to grow and in August reached a record level of €18.3 billion, an increase of 1.7% compared with the previous month and an increase of 8.9% compared with the same month of the previous year.²

On September 12th, Serbian police arrested Edin Vranj, a former Bosniak police officer, for alleged war crimes committed against Serb prisoners during the war in Gorazde. This was the third such arrest of Bosniaks for alleged war crimes by Serbian authorities since 2018. Husein Mujanovic was arrested while trying to enter Serbia in July 2018 and Osman Osmanovic was arrested in November 2019; both of them remain in prison in Belgrade undergoing trial, despite repeated attempts by Bosnian authorities to secure their deportation or release. BiH officials complained that Serbian authorities are arresting Bosniaks who were serving as ordinary soldiers or low-level officials during the war, in order to increase pressure on Sarajevo. Because of this latest arrest, the Bosnian Foreign Ministry has informed all BiH citizens who served in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBIH) during the war, to refrain from crossing into Serbia. On the other side, some Bosniak intellectuals suggested that Bosnia should establish a reciprocal approach and issue arrest warrants for some 50,000 Serb soldiers and officers who are known to have been fighting in the country during the 1992-5 war.

Another blow to regional and local stability took place after the Serbian and RS governments adopted a joint draft law on the “protection of the Cyrillic alphabet” on the territory of RS and Serbia. This law, which local and international experts and officials see as a challenge to basic human rights, establishes punishments for public companies and institutions that do not use Cyrillic letters in their titles and offers rewards for those companies that do so. This law was swiftly adopted by the RS National Assembly on September 15th, but was immediately blocked by Bosniak deputies, who used the

1 Central Bank of Bosnia - Herzegovina (<https://www.cbbh.ba>)
2 Central Bank of Bosnia - Herzegovina (<https://www.cbbh.ba>)

mechanism for the protection of ethnic vital national interest, which can eventually refer the disputed law to the RS and later BiH Constitutional Courts.

On the same day, September 15th, the Serbian and Bosnian Serb political leaderships held a joint celebration of the Day of Serb Unity, Freedom and National Flag. This day was introduced and celebrated for the first time on September 15th in 2020, in reference to the Serb, French, British and other allied soldiers' historic breakthrough at the Thessaloniki front in 1918. Vucic and Dodik have been using this date and this celebration to revive the idea of an "all-Serb nation," which the two of them individually use as a key part of their respective pre-election campaigns (and in complete disregard to the occasional and increasing hiccups in their personal relations). Both Vucic and Dodik have been increasingly using this narrative in their campaigns, although details of this narrative differ significantly from one PR occasion to the next. Dodik has frequently used this narrative to suggest possible unification of all Serbs in one nation state, while on other occasions both officials openly denied any plans for territorial changes in the Balkans.

All these developments, as expected, triggered a strong response from Bosnian/Bosniak officials, institutions and intellectuals. On September 15th, BiH's State Investigation and Protection Agency, SIPA, arrested Radovan Veljovic, a Serb accused of raping Bosniak girls during the war, which Serb (and Russian) media such as Sputnik, B92 and others immediately described as the Bosniak response to the arrest of Edin Vranj. Furthermore, a number of Bosniak intellectuals, experts and journalists openly called for the abolition of Republika Srpska and threatened with going to war to defend BiH³.

Another important development took place on September 23rd, when Bosnia's Constitutional Court ruled that parts of the RS law regulating ownership, management and use of forests in that entity is not in line with the BiH Constitution. This ruling provided the answer to the years-long heated debates about the ownership of land in Bosnia and whether the ownership over the land and its resources belongs to the state, or its two entities. The ruling was welcomed by Bosniak officials, but rejected and strongly criticized in Republika Srpska, while Dodik used this decision to renew his calls for a law that would prevent implementation of state laws on the territory of RS. Some Bosnian Serb officials and experts say that regardless of the legal correctness of this

³ <https://nap.ba/news/84060>

decision, the timing of this Constitutional Court decision has only further contributed to the growing ethnic and political tensions in BiH.

A series of Dodik's radical statements reached their peak at the session of the SNSD's leadership on October 8th, after which Dodik announced that his party has started preparations for the withdrawal of RS from the BiH joint armed forces, the Indirect Taxation Authority, as well as from the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC). Dodik added that SNSD has established working groups that are preparing these proposals, which according to him should be presented to the RS National Assembly in the next few weeks. Since all responsibilities - which have in the past been transferred from the entities to the state level - cannot be withdrawn now without approval from the state authorities, such unilateral moves by the RS would represent a major blow to BiH's integrity and functioning of its state institutions.

On Monday, October 11th, Dodik attended a dinner in Belgrade with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Speaker of the Serbian Parliament Ivica Dacic. According to several sources, during the dinner Lavrov "showed understanding" for Dodik and his plans to undo all administrative changes that have been made in Bosnia since 1995, so as to bring the country back to the "original Dayton". However, Lavrov also reportedly warned Dodik "not to go beyond the Dayton agreement." This was, apparently, exactly what Dodik needed to get his plan started. Immediately upon his return to Banja Luka, on Tuesday, October 12th, he held a press conference before the session of the presidency of his SNSD party. At the press conference, he announced details of his plan, according to which the SNSD will prepare and table a set of laws that would withdraw RS from the joint armed forces, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, Indirect taxation agency, state security bodies (and establish RS's own intelligence agency). It would also propose a law that would block the implementation of state laws and work of state institutions on the territory of RS. Dodik underlined that RS "does not want war" but is ready to defend itself from any eventual attacks or any other hostile actions by "Muslims." He also repeated on several occasions that his intentions are "very serious" and that "there is no going back after this." Dodik's statement was aimed as much at the leadership of his own party as it was aimed at the public. Namely, in the coming days he will tighten his control over the SNSD leadership and their coalition parties in the RS National Assembly (RSNA), to ensure that this proposal gets a sufficient majority. On Thursday, October 14th, Dodik held a meeting with the representatives of EU embassies, where he informed them of his plans, adding that

the RS National Assembly session where the proposed set of laws will be discussed and voted on, was already set for October 25th. Dodik warned the diplomats that if the US and EU try to impose sanctions on the RS, he would - instead of the “original Dayton” - go for full independence of RS. Dodik’s proposal, if adopted by the RSNA, would represent a major violation of the Bosnian constitution and laws, since the RS has no legal right to adopt such legislation pertaining to state-level competencies. Furthermore, eventual implementation of Dodik’s plan would likely threaten the integrity of even “original” BiH state institutions, as it would create legal and political chaos, interrupt normal financial flows and possibly even the electoral process, blocking the organization of the 2022 general elections.

2.2 What does Dodik really want?

By mid-October, these developments dramatically increased ethnic and political tensions in BiH. It also raised fears among a part of the population and experts of a possible new conflict either as a result of further unilateral moves undermining the integrity of BiH’s institutions, or due to some individual ethnic incident amidst heightened tensions.

This situation is haunting local and international experts and officials, who are trying to fathom whether Dodik is really determined to move forward with his separatist agenda, and if yes, how this situation could best be addressed. The first question has created two opposing schools of thought:

Given the fact that Dodik has been threatening separation of RS since he came back to power in RS in 2005, the first school of thought believes that he has used this rhetoric primarily to maintain power in RS for the past 16 years. Having in mind that after all these years Dodik still did not deliver on his threat, and given the fact that such a move would likely have devastating consequences for BiH, RS and Dodik himself, it concludes that Dodik’s threat will most likely remain nothing more than his pre-election stunt.

The other school of thought focuses not so much on his words but his deeds, which show that in parallel with his separatist rhetoric, Dodik has been steadily pulling RS away from the rest of the country, making it by now an almost completely autonomous entity. Pundits who adhere to this line of thinking warn that Dodik may be indeed preparing himself, the RS and the rest of the local and international community for the final move –

territorial or at least legal secession of the RS. Furthermore, some experts warn that the recent weaknesses and divisions within and between Western actors, may be offering the perfect opportunity for final separation, as it minimizes the probability of a strong, concrete and coherent response from the US and EU.

Some also believe that even if Dodik forces the West to use sanctions against him, or even remove him from office, that scenario may also be beneficial for him, as it would make him a martyr in the eyes of many Serbs in the Balkans. This would ensure Dodik's exit strategy without fears of possible reprisals from his political opponents. Furthermore, most pundits agree that one of the main reasons why Dodik seems to be moving on with his separatist agenda is his attempt to undo BiH's electoral system. Namely, Dodik and his SNSD, as well as both other main ethnic parties – the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action, (SDA) and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) – are all facing growing criticism and pressure from their own constituencies. The SNSD and SDA are in a particularly bad situation and risk losing next year's general elections and could therefore profit from blocking Western initiatives for electoral reform – or even blocking holding of country-wide elections – in order to remain in power indefinitely.

2.3 What does HDZ BiH really want?

Several Bosnian Croat and Croatian sources say that the Bosnian Croat population, as well as the Croatian government, are increasingly worried over the latest developments in BiH. They fear that in case of a breakup of BiH, Bosnian Croats – as the smallest ethnic group – will be the first “victim” of that situation, as they will be left “alone” with Bosniaks in the Federation entity and will not be able to match their significantly larger numbers. According to the 2013 census, there are 1.5 million Bosniaks and slightly less than half a million Croats living in the Federation. However these and other experts agree that this discrepancy is even larger, since the number of Bosnian Croats has been significantly reduced since the last census and is now believed to be around (or under) 300,000.

Nevertheless, these sources said that the latest developments – visits of the leader of the BiH Islamic Community Reis Husein Kavazovic and of the SDA leader Bakir Izetbegovic to Zagreb between October 10th and 12th – offer small hope that relations between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats may improve. In light of these developments, official Zagreb has “softened” and improved its position towards the Bosniak leadership.

Nevertheless, both sources expressed concerns that HDZ leader Dragan Covic is “playing a double game” and continues cooperating with Dodik in his efforts to break BiH apart. Such developments could benefit Covic, as it would provide him with an opportunity to establish a third entity, Herceg Bosna, which HDZ could not achieve through any normal political or legal process. These intensions of HDZ BiH and other Bosnian Croat hardliners were also reflected at the session of the Croat National Council (HNS) on Monday, October 11th. At this session, the HNS mirrored Dodik’s positions, concluding that BiH has to be brought back to the “original Dayton” or will break apart. Furthermore, other sources say that Covic continues planning the withdrawal of the HDZ from the State Parliament in December, citing the expected failure of electoral reforms. With such positions, the Bosnian Croat leadership risks further provoking Bosniaks, who could turn against both Bosnian Serbs and Croats in an attempt to defend BiH from a breakup. Bosnian Croat positioning in the coming period will be critical, since even a small rapprochement between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats would seriously weaken Dodik’s initiative and provide a chance for a more peaceful solution. On the other hand, further radicalization of HDZ BiH positions would likely also radicalize Bosniaks and could lead to a three-way partition of BiH, which could hardly end without a new war.

2.4 What do the Russians really want?

According to a leading Moscow-based expert for Russian foreign policy, Moscow currently does not seem to be planning to block the extension of the EUFOR mandate, at the session of the UNSC where this issue will be discussed (sometime between November 2 and 5). The source said that Moscow believes that such a move would risk escalating the crisis in its relations with the West and is hence still reluctant to do this. Moscow’s reluctance is even greater in light of the recent meetings, which US Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland held in Moscow on October 11th-12th with Putin's deputy chief of staff, Dmitry Kozak, senior presidential aide Yury Ushakov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. According to this source, Moscow sees these meetings as another small positive sign of gradual thawing of their relations with the US. Therefore, it would not risk that trend because of the Balkans or BiH where they have little strategic interest. The source said that unless there is some new hiccup in East-West relations, Moscow is most likely going to abstain from voting on the extension of the EUFOR mandate in the UNSC at the beginning of November. However, the source also confirmed that regardless of the Kremlin’s position on EUFOR, it is clear that it has

significantly hardened its position on BiH. Moscow indeed seems to be ready to support Dodik's plan for reverting the country back to the "original Dayton" and would not care too much even if it would lead to some new limited conflict, the source said. He added that the Kremlin believes that such a scenario would only provide additional evidence of the complete collapse of the Western peacekeeping mission (especially after its humiliation in Afghanistan).

2.5 What will the West do?

Despite the obviously deepening BiH crisis and serious threat which Dodik's plan represents for the integrity of the country, there are no indications that the EU, the US and/or OHR have any plan or even an idea on how to address this situation. For the time being, Western officials are calling for calm and issue statements reiterating their support for the territorial integrity of BiH. Nevertheless, there seem to be no current initiatives – either at the level of the diplomatic community in BiH or at the level of Western capitals – that would actually result in concrete actions protecting BiH's seriously shaken integrity. Quite the opposite, rivalry and divisions among EU, US and OHR officials seem to be growing.

3.0 Economic and Social Developments

3.1 Economic Recovery Continues

In the second quarter of this year, BiH recorded real growth of its gross domestic product (GDP) of 11.6% compared with the same period the previous year. Compared to the previous quarter, seasonally adjusted data shows that GDP increased by 1.9%, indicating that the economy continues recovering after the pandemic slow-down in 2020.⁴ The BiH Central Bank estimated that real GDP growth in BiH in the first half of 2021, compared to the first half of 2019, the pre-pandemic year, amounted to 4.1%, which also validated reports of the recovery of BiH's economy.⁵

These positive signals are even more significant in light of the fact that the BiH economy as usual slowed down during the summer. In August, BiH exports dropped 8% compared to the previous month, but still were 39.7% higher than in the same month in 2020. Imports also decreased by 8.6% compared with the previous month, but were still 34.3% higher compared with the same month the previous year. Overall, for the first eight months this year, exports were 32.5% higher and imports 22.6% higher, compared with the same period the previous year.⁶ This represents an encouraging sign, but it also increased the foreign trade deficit by 7% compared with the first eight months of 2020.

In the meantime, Standard & Poor's in August confirmed the existing sovereign credit rating of BiH at "B with stable outlook," while Moody's is yet to update its "B3 with stable outlook" rating from August 2020.⁷

Although the GDP, industrial production and foreign trade indicates strong post-pandemic economic recovery, when it comes to employment, the picture is less bright. The latest available data from July shows the total number of employed persons actually decreased by 0.1% compared with the previous month, although in comparison with the same month of 2020 the number of employed persons in BiH was higher by 1.6%.⁸

4 https://bhas.gov.ba/data/Publikacije/Saopstenja/2021/NAC_02_2021_Q2_0_BS.pdf

5 <https://www.cbbh.ba/press/ShowNews/1376>

6 Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina (<http://bhas.gov.ba>)

7 <https://www.cbbh.ba/Content/Read/549?title=KreditnirejtingBiH>

8 Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina (<http://bhas.gov.ba>)

Although the officially registered unemployment rate in BiH in July was 32.5%, the data produced by the BiH Agency for statistics according to the International labor organization (ILO) methodology, in the second quarter of 2021 the unemployment rate in BiH was 18%, which is more realistic than the nominal unemployment rate.⁹

One of the risks for the Bosnian economy as well as for the fragile social stability is rising prices. In August, inflation measured by CPI, increased by 0.2% compared with the previous month and 2.3% compared with the same month the previous year.¹⁰ The real risk, however, lies in the expected radical increase in the prices of electricity.

According to media reports, business associations are already warned by local power companies that they can expect increases of prices between 70% and 120%.¹¹ While citizens will be spared from new prices for the time being, this is just a temporary delay, as the expected huge increase in prices of electricity is perceived as a major problem for the whole of Europe. Furthermore, any increase in prices of electricity for businesses will inevitably result in higher prices for most products, which means that consumers, especially the most vulnerable unemployed, pensioners and workers with minimal salaries, will suffer this hit even before electricity prices get raised for citizens.

An unexpected rise in prices of electricity combined with the recent announcement of the Chinese government that they will stop financing construction of new coal power plants abroad raised questions about the planned construction of Block 7 of the Tuzla thermal power plant, as well as about BiH's strategy for long-term energy supplies.¹² This situation is also raising questions about the future of BiH's industrial production, primarily aluminum and steel, which is based on availability of cheap electricity. At this moment, BiH is a net exporter of electricity but without adequate replacement for the Tuzla power plant, BiH will turn into a net importer of electricity with prices in the long term set to go higher. This could have devastating consequences for the BiH economy as well as for standards of living of the population.¹³¹⁴ In addition, the EU's growing carbon tax will also

9 https://bhas.gov.ba/data/Publikacije/Saopštenja/2021/LAB_00_2021_Q2_1_BS.pdf

10 Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina (<http://bhas.gov.ba>)

11 <https://balkangreenenergynews.com/electricity-price-hike-of-up-to-135-percent-announced-in-bih-serbia/>

12 <https://www.sarajevotimes.com/what-is-the-fate-of-block-7-in-tuzla-concerns-are-growing-there-is-no-final-answer>

13 <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina/>

14 <https://www.intellinews.com/bnegr-green-western-balkans-power-plants-in-doubt-after-china-to-drop-overseas-coal-projects-221599/>

affect Bosnian industry, as its high proportion of electricity produced from coal will additionally reduce the competitiveness of BiH producers on their main market, the EU.

Statistical data

Foreign trade

Month	BiH Export (mil. EUR)			Change (pct)	
	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	395	600	552	-8,0	39,7

Source: Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Month	BiH Import (mil. EUR)			Change (pct)	
	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	667	980	896	-8,6	34,3

Source: Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina

January – August 2021

Period	BiH Export (mil. EUR)			Change (pct)	BiH Import (mil. EUR)		Change (pct)
	I-VIII 2020	I-VIII 2021	I-VIII 2021/ I-VIII 2020		I-VIII 2020	I-VIII 2021	
	3.366	4.461	32,5	5.528	6.778	22,6	

Source: Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Foreign Exchange Reserves

	Foreign exchange reserves (EUR billion)			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	6,79	7,44	7,90	6,2	16,3

Source: Central Bank of BiH

Banking sector

Total assets commercial banking sector

June 2021

	Total assets commercial banking sector in BiH (EUR billion)			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	16,8	18,0	18,3	1,7	8,9

Source: Central Bank of BiH

Inflation (CPI)

Inflation (CPI) in BiH in pct		
Month	VIII-2021 / VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII-2020
	0,2	2,3

Source: Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Industrial production

Industrial production			
FBiH (pct)		RS (pct)	
VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII-2020	VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII-2020
-2,1	9,1	0,4	7,4
Source: Institute for Statistics of FBiH			
Source: Institute of Statistics - Republic of Srpska			

Employment and Unemployment

	Number of employed in B&H			Change (pct)	
Month	VII-2020	VI-2021	VII-2021	VII-2021/VI-2021	VII-2021 / VII-2020
	807.326	820.979	819.857	-0,1	1,6
Source: Labour and Employment Agency of Bosnia – Herzegovina					

	Number of unemployed persons in BiH			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	427.593	395.383	392.551	-0,7	-8,2
Source: Labour and Employment Agency of Bosnia – Herzegovina					

Wages

	Average net wages in BiH (EUR)			Change (pct)	
Month	VII-2020	VI-2021	VII-2021	VII-2021/VI-2021	VII-2021 / VII-2020
	492	508	511	0,6	3,9

Source: Agency for statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina

	Average net wages in FBiH (EUR)			Change (pct)	
Month	VII-2020	VI-2021	VII-2021	VII-2021/VI-2021	VII-2021 / VII-2020
	495	509	507	-0,4	2,4

Source: Institute for Statistics of FBiH

	Average net wages in RS (EUR)			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/ VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	491	520	523	0,6	6,5

Source: Institute of Statistics - Republic of Srpska

Pensions

	FBIH number of pensioners			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	427.883	425.962	426.476	0,0	0,0
Source: Federal pension and disability insurance institute					

	FBIH average pension (EUR)			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	218	219	219	0,0	0,5
Source: Federal pension and disability insurance institute					

	RS number of pensioners			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	270.146	271.699	272.164	0,2	0,7
Source: Fund for pension and disability insurance RS					

	RS average pension (EUR)			Change (pct)	
Month	VIII-2020	VII-2021	VIII-2021	VIII-2021/VII-2021	VIII-2021 / VIII -2020
	201	207	207	0	3,0
Source: Fund for pension and disability insurance RS					